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INTRODUCTION* 
When it comes to arbitration, “[t]he Supreme Court has created a monster.”1  
Traditionally, contracting parties used arbitration as a method of decreasing the costs and 
uncertainty of litigation.  However, arbitration now has many of the same characteristics as 
                                                 
* Salina Maxwell is a student at Michigan State University College of Law; a Dean King’s Scholar; with a 
Juris Doctor anticipated for May 2011.  The author thanks Professor Daniel D. Barnhizer for helping to inspire the 
ideas and concepts addressed in this paper.  Without his guidance, comments, and suggestions throughout the 
writing process, this Note would not have been possible.   
1 Marcia Coyle, “Arbitration Showdown Looms Between Congress, Supreme Court,” THE NATIONAL LAW 
JOURNAL, June 14, 2010.    
2 
 
conventional litigation,2 making it costly and time-consuming.  Moreover, repeat players 
aggressively use arbitration to exploit opportunistic advantages from unsophisticated parties, 
further calling into question the value of the policies favoring arbitration.  Despite these well-
known problems, the Supreme Court has a strong pro-arbitration bias in favor of enforcing 
arbitration provisions regardless of context, often justifying its jurisprudence on a flawed 
understanding of the Federal Arbitration Act.3 
Importantly, the ultimate goal for the arbitration doctrine is to create and enforce law that 
supports and effectuates national dispute resolution policy, which can only be accomplished by 
recognizing the facts on the ground associated with arbitration.  Current arbitration 
jurisprudence, however, reflects a breakdown in the trichotomy between the facts, the law, and 
the policy.  Though Congress’s recent actions suggest that at least some members recognize this 
breakdown and hope to reform arbitration law and policy,4 the Supreme Court has yet to 
recognize the flaws in its application of the FAA.5  
Part I of this paper examines the history and background of arbitration in the United 
States, looking especially at the initial judicial opposition toward arbitration agreements and the 
ways in which that resentment influenced congressional and judicial support over the past 
century.  Part II discusses the current disparity between arbitration law, arbitration policy, and 
arbitration facts.  Part III examines legislative and judicial efforts—at both the state and federal 
levels—that are aimed at reforming arbitration law and solving the problems in the current 
doctrine.  The paper concludes by urging the Court to take action and alter its approach toward 
                                                 
2 See discussion infra Subsection II.B.1. (discussing the changing costs and efficiency of arbitration). 
3 See discussion infra Section II.A. 
4 See discussion infra Section III.A. 
5 See infra notes 176-185 and accompanying discussion.   
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arbitration to reflect the changing facts associated with arbitration and to redirect the law to more 
properly effectuate dispute resolution policy.   
I.  THE EVOLUTION OF ARBITRATION LAW IN THE UNITED STATES 
 Though arbitration today enjoys a favored position in Supreme Court jurisprudence, 
courts prior to 1925 were resentful toward alternative dispute resolution because it infringed on 
the courts’ jurisdiction.  This resentment was generally based in public policy as the courts 
distrusted an informal dispute resolution mechanism that lacked the same expertise and authority 
as the judiciary.6  The courts channeled this hostility by refusing to enforce arbitration 
agreements, regardless of the parties’ intent.7 
A. The History of Arbitration in the United States  
 Arbitration is not a new phenomenon.  Instead, arbitration dates back to biblical times 
and ancient Rome.8  “Prior to the rise of nationalism in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, 
merchants from England, Europe, and elsewhere traversed the Mediterranean and Atlantic to 
conduct trade.”9  Rather than submitting disputes to the courts—as locating one court with 
authority over the numerous international parties would have been difficult or impossible—
“[t]hese merchants resolved their commercial disputes by referring to business customs that had 
evolved within their trades. . . . [and these] customs came to be recognized as the lex mercatoria 
or the law merchant.”10  In response to merchants becoming more stationary, and in an effort to 
promote nationalist ideals, governments started taking a more active role in regulating trade after 
                                                 
6 See infra notes 8-22 and accompanying text.   
7 See discussion infra Section I.A. 
8 Thomas E. Carbonneau, Arbitral Justice:  The Demise of Due Process in American Law, 70 TUL. L. REV. 
1945, 1947 (1996). 
9 Mark Garavaglia, In Search of the Proper Law in Transnational Commercial Disputes, 12 N.Y.L. SCH. J. 
INT’L & COMP.L. 29, 29 (1991). 
10 Id.  
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the seventeenth century.11  Accordingly, new attitudes toward arbitration included varying 
degrees of distrust and resentment. 
Arbitration has been used in the United States as a private dispute resolution mechanism 
since the colonial era.12  Despite its longstanding use, however, arbitration competed 
unsuccessfully with public judicial dispute resolution mechanisms—often because courts 
interfered with, or refused to enforce, alternative agreements.13  In the colonial era, for example, 
remnants from English law were the primary influences on arbitration in the United States,14 and 
the English courts’ traditionally inhospitable treatment of arbitration agreements found its way 
into early American jurisprudence.15   
This influence was evident in America during the eighteenth century, and "the frequent 
overturning of awards suggests . . . that the courts were willing to interpose themselves in the 
settlement process after the conclusion of an award."16  As a result, in both nineteenth-century 
Europe and the United States, arbitration was viewed as an illegitimate dispute resolution 
mechanism: 
[Arbitration was] viewed as a process that functioned in derogation of legality. It 
was a bastard remedy, incapable of being integrated into the self-respecting 
family of adjudication. It had the right blood, but lacked official status and proper 
                                                 
11 Id.  (“During the seventeenth century, merchants became less transient and governments took a more 
dominant role in matters of trade. These and other sociological factors curtailed the use and growth of the law 
merchant as a means of resolving disputes among international merchants.”). 
12 See Carbonneau, supra note 8, at 1948-49; see also Jean R. Sternlight, Creeping Mandatory Arbitration: 
Is it Just?, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1631, 1635 (2005) (noting that the use of arbitration predated the formation of the 
country).   
13 See generally Eben Moglen, Commercial Arbitration in the Eighteenth Century: Searching for the 
Transformation of American Law, 93 YALE L. J. 135 (1983) (discussing judicial attitudes toward arbitration in the 
eighteenth century).  However, some small communities did use and support arbitration for local disputes.  See 
David S. Schwartz, Enforcing Small Print to Protect Big Business: Employee and Consumer Rights Claims in an 
Age of Compelled Arbitration, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 33, 70 (1997) ("[A]rbitration was a simple, democratic and 
neighborly way for equals to resolve their differences without relying on lawyers, legally-trained judges, or their 
arcane language and procedures.").   
14 See Carbonneau, supra note 8, at 1948-49; see also Sternlight, supra note 12, at 1635.  
15 Carbonneau, supra note 8, at 1948-49 (suggesting that arbitration provisions were considered to be the 
equivalent to “justice under a tree”).  See also supra notes 16-22 and accompanying discussion. 
16 Moglen, supra note 13, at 138. 
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standing. Arbitrators were caricatures of their judicial siblings—“pie-splitters,” 
who lacked requisite pedigree and cultivation.17 
With this view of arbitration, courts often showed outright hostility toward arbitration 
agreements prior to 1925.18  For example, in the 1845 case of Tobey v. County of Bristol, Justice 
Story stated that “[c]ourts of equity do not refuse to interfere to compel a party specifically to 
perform an agreement to refer to arbitration, because they wish to discourage arbitrations, as 
against public policy.”19  Similarly, in discussing the court’s refusal to appoint a valuer, the court 
in Paris v. Greig noted that appointing a valuer “. . . would be equivalent to enforcing an 
agreement to refer to arbitration, which equity always declines to do, among other reasons, 
because it is against public policy to permit agreements to oust the courts of jurisdiction.”20   
Ultimately, judicial opposition toward arbitration in these early cases was generally 
grounded in two themes.  First, many courts resisted arbitration because arbitration usurped the 
court’s authority and jurisdiction.21  Second, public policy seemed to weigh against permitting 
non-specialists to make their own law.22  Essentially, courts disapproved of arbitration because 
                                                 
17 Carbonneau, supra note 8, at 1947. 
18 See discussion supra Section I.B. (discussing the enactment of the Federal Arbitration Act in 1925 and 
the shifting attitudes of the courts).  See also Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 14 (1984) (discussing the 
enactment of the Federal Arbitration Act in 1925 and noting that “[t]he problems Congress faced were . . . twofold: 
the old common-law hostility toward arbitration, and the failure of state arbitration statutes to mandate enforcement 
of arbitration agreements”) (emphasis added).   
19 Tobey v. County of Bristol, 23 F. Cas. 1313, 1320 (C.C.D. Mass. 1845) (No. 14,065) (“[I]t cannot be 
correctly said, that public policy, in our age, generally favors or encourages arbitrations, which are to be final and 
conclusive, to an extent beyond that which belongs to the ordinary operations of the common law. It is certainly the 
policy of the common law, not to compel men to submit their rights and interests to arbitration, or to enforce 
agreements for such a purpose.”).   
20 12 Haw. 274; 1899 WL 1556, *5 (1899) (emphasis added). See also American Cent. Ins. Co. v. Bass, 38 
S.W. 1119, 1119 (1897) (“It seems to be generally held that a stipulation that the question of liability shall be 
determined by arbitration is contrary to public policy and void. . . .”).   
21 Carbonneau, supra note 8, at 1947 (“Arbitrators could only pretend to be what they were not and never 
could be: real judges.”).  Courts perceived arbitration as an illegitimate form of dispute resolution because 
arbitrators were acting as judges when, in fact, arbitrators did not have the same authority as judges.  See, e.g., 
Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 57-58 (1974) (expressing the view that arbitration was seen as 
inferior to resolution of claims by the judiciary); Paris v. Grieg, 12 Haw. 274; 1899 WL 1556, *5 (1899).   
22 Carbonneau, supra note 8, at 1947.  Arbitration allowed “ordinary citizens . . . [to] make their own law 
and disregard judicial process by the vehicle of contract arrangement.”  Id. 
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arbitration invaded upon the Court’s expertise in resolving disputes, but did not have the same 
legitimacy as judicial resolution.  
B. The Golden Age - Congress’s Attempt to Balance the Facts, the Law, and the Policy  
 
Attitudes toward arbitration began shifting around the 1920s.  This shift occurred because 
Congress wanted to distance the United States’ treatment of arbitration from the hostile 
influences of English law.23  Further, the facts concerning arbitration did not warrant the 
judiciary’s refusal to enforce and approve of arbitration agreements.  For example, three primary 
assumptions after the eighteenth century supported the enforcement of arbitration agreements—
arbitration was a cheap, quick, and discrete method of dispute resolution;24 arbitrators could be 
neutral;25 and parties could bind themselves to contracts to which they expressly and rationally 
consent.26  These factual assumptions suggested that arbitration could help effectuate several key 
dispute resolution policies—such as (1) promoting efficiency,27 (2) providing access to justice,28 
(3) ensuring freedom of contract,29 and (4) diminishing the burden on the courts.30   
                                                 
23 See H.R. REP. NO. 68-96, at 1 (1924) (“The need for the [the FAA] arises from an anachronism of our 
American law. Some centuries ago, because of the jealousy of the English courts for their own jurisdiction, they 
refused to enforce specific agreements to arbitrate upon the ground that the courts were thereby ousted from their 
jurisdiction. This jealousy survived for so long a period that the principle became firmly embedded in the English 
common law and was adopted with it by the American courts.”). 
24 See generally H.R. REP. NO. 68-96, at 1 (1924) (discussing Congress’s belief that “action should be taken 
at this time when there is so much agitation against the costliness and delays of litigation” and noting that these 
concerns “can be largely eliminated by agreements for arbitration”). 
25 Id.  See also David J. Branson, American Party-Appointed Arbitrators – Not the Three Monkeys, 30 U. 
DAYTON L. REV. 1, 13 (2004) (“In the 19th century, American courts applied the same standards of impartiality to 
arbitrators that they applied to judges, often citing English decisions.”). 
26 See generally JOHN RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS:  A RESTATEMENT 87 (2001) (“Parties are rational in 
that they can rank their final ends consistently; they deliberate guided by such principles as:  to adopt the most 
effective means to one’s ends; to select the alternative most likely to advance those ends; to schedule activities so 
that, ceteris paribus, more rather than less of those ends can be fulfilled.”); see also Ige Omotayo Bolodeoku, 
Contractarianism and Corporate Law:  Alternative Explanations to the Law’s Mandatory and Enabling/Default 
Contents, 13 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 433, 452 (2005) (“Because contracting parties are rational, they are 
ascribed the capacity to negotiate and agree on terms they believe best serve their interests.”); CHARLES FRIED, 
CONTRACT AS PROMISE 2 (1981) (“The will theory of contract, which sees contractual obligations as essentially self-
imposed, is a fair implication of liberal individualism.”). 
27 See H.R. REP. NO. 68-96, at 1 (1924) (discussing Congress’s desire to promote efficiency).   
28 See generally Lawrence M. Friedman, Access to Justice: Some Historical Comments, 37 FORDHAM URB. 
L.J. 3, 5-6 (2010) (“Access to justice is not just a matter of courts in the basement of the house of justice. Many legal 
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Accordingly, at the beginning of the nineteenth century, arbitration facts and arbitration 
policy complemented and reflected each other.  First, if arbitration was cheap, quick, and 
discrete, then allowing those agreements to be enforced would promote efficiency (policy 1).  
Second, if arbitrators were neutral, then enforcing arbitration agreements would provide parties 
with access to justice (policy 2).  Third, if parties can bind themselves to contracts to which they 
consent, then allowing those parties to enter into agreements that would be enforced would 
promote freedom of contract (policy 3).  Finally, arbitration, by its very nature, diminishes the 
burden on the courts by providing an alternative method of dispute resolution (policy 4).   With 
the facts and the policy coinciding, the judiciary’s refusal to enforce and support arbitration was 
unsustainable. 
Congress took the first step to realign arbitration law when it enacted the Federal 
Arbitration Act (FAA) in 1925.31  The FAA created a federal statutory regime that sought to 
place arbitration agreements—when used in maritime transactions and in contracts “involving 
commerce”32—“on equal footing with all other contracts” and to combat judicial hostility toward 
those agreements.33  Essentially, the FAA “declared a national policy favoring arbitration and 
                                                                                                                                                             
developments in the late twentieth century had a real impact on access to justice. Laws were passed that opened the 
way into the legal system for the underdogs, or the lawyers who represented them.”). 
29 See Mark Pettit, Jr., Freedom, Freedom of Contract, and the “Rise and Fall,” 79 B.U. L. REV. 263, 305 
n.162 (1999) (noting that “[freedom of contract] was still strong in 1905 when Lochner v. New York was decided, 
and some view this period as the ‘zenith’ of contract in the United States”); Stephen A. Siegel, Understanding the 
Nineteenth Century Contract Clause:  The Role of the Property-Privilege Distinction and “Takings” Clause 
Jurisprudence, 60 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 8 (1986) (“By the nineteenth century, the sanctity of contracts entered into by 
individuals in the exercise of their common law rights had long been one of the central norms of Liberal social 
thought.”). 
30 See, e.g., Margaret Meriwether Cordray, Settlement Agreements and the Supreme Court, 48 HASTINGS 
L.J. 9, 27 (noting that “[p]ublic policy favors the private settlement of disputes because settlements ease the burden 
on courts, conserve judicial resources, reduce the expense and risk of litigation for parties, and promote more lasting 
conciliation” and that “[i]f every case were litigated to the limit, the courts would collapse under the weight of their 
dockets”). 
31 9 U.S.C. §1-14 (2009).  See generally Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 443 
(2006) (discussing that the FAA was intended to replace current hostility and opposition to the enforcement of 
arbitration agreements with a national policy favoring arbitration). 
32 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2009).    
33 H.R. REP. NO. 68-96, at 1 (1924). 
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withdrew the power of the states to require a judicial forum for the resolution of claims which 
the contracting parties agreed to resolve by arbitration.”34   
The text of the FAA provides specific guidelines for appointing arbitrators,35 compelling 
arbitration,36 challenging and confirming awards,37 and appealing arbitration decisions.38  To 
ensure that parties to an arbitration agreement receive the benefits of their contracts, Section 3 of 
the FAA even provides that, “on application of one of the parties[,] [the court shall] stay the trial 
of the action until such arbitration has been had in accordance with the terms of the agreement, 
providing the applicant for the stay is not in default in proceeding with such arbitration.”39  
These provisions provide the substantive and procedural requirements—such as allowing parties 
to compel arbitration—that are necessary to ensure that the FAA can be properly effectuated by 
the courts, which are tasked with enforcing the agreements.   
In the decades immediately following its enactment, the Supreme Court issued very few 
decisions referencing the FAA.40  However, beginning with Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & 
Conklin Manufacturing Co. in 1967,41 the Supreme Court took a more active role in issuing 
decisions under the FAA.42  These decisions expanded arbitration law by broadly interpreting the 
individual sections of the FAA and by applying the FAA to new contractual contexts not 
                                                 
34 Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10 (1984).    
35 9 U.S.C. § 5 (2009).    
36 9 U.S.C. § 4 (2009).  See also 9 U.S.C. § 7 (2009) (discussing the guidelines for compelling the 
attendance of witnesses).    
37 9 U.S.C. § 9 (2009) (confirmation of awards); 9 U.S.C. § 10 (2009) (vacatur of awards); 9 U.S.C. § 11 
(2009) (modification or correction of awards).       
38 9 U.S.C. § 16 (2009).    
39 9 U.S.C. § 3 (2009).    
40 A Westlaw search revealed only fifteen Supreme Court cases from 1925 to 1966 referencing the FAA.  
In contrast, since the Supreme Court decided Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Manufacturing Co. in 1967—
which is considered to be a turning point in the Supreme Court’s FAA jurisprudence—there have been fifty-one 
cases specifically referencing the FAA.   
41 388 U.S. 395 (1967) (requiring the parties to arbitrate a claim for fraud in the inducement of the contract 
as a general matter—as opposed to fraud in the inducement of the arbitration agreement alone—when there was no 
evidence that the parties intended to withhold such a claim from arbitration).   
42 See infra note 40.  
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originally anticipated by federal legislators when they passed the statute.43  With this new pro-
arbitration bias, the Supreme Court transformed arbitration from a contract term on equal footing 
with other provisions into a “super” contract term, essentially giving arbitration agreements more 
force and effect than traditional contract clauses.44   
II.  THE BREAKDOWN BETWEEN ARBITRATION LAW, POLICY, AND FACTS 
The Supreme Court’s application and expansion of the FAA—specifically the treatment of 
arbitration as a “super” contract term—made the inclusion of arbitration agreements attractive to 
contracting parties.  Accordingly, with the availability of this new “super” contract term, many 
contracting parties began to employ suspect methods to obtain “consent” from—and to take 
advantage of—one-shot contracting parties.45   
A. Disconnecting the Law:  The Supreme Court’s Expansion of Arbitration Law 
In the decades immediately following the enactment of the FAA, arbitration law existed 
in a golden age because the FAA reflected the realities of arbitration and provided the necessary 
legal authority to support arbitration agreements—in the limited contexts envisioned by the 
statute.46  However, this golden age was more in theory than in reality because the FAA, on its 
own, was largely ineffectual at changing contracting behaviors.  However, beginning with Prima 
Paint in 1967, the Supreme Court began issuing “a series of decisions that permitted businesses 
to use arbitration in situations they had never previously thought permissible" and which gave 
                                                 
43 See id.  For example, prior to the enactment of the FAA, the areas where it was considered acceptable to 
use arbitration agreements was quite limited, and arbitration was largely restricted to “business-to-business or 
management/union” type contracts.  Sternlight, supra note 12, at 1636.  Arbitration agreements were conspicuously 
absent from employment contracts, commercial contracts, and in the resolution of statutory claims, and those who 
spoke on the passage of the FAA “made clear that they did not view such a use of arbitration as appropriate.”  Id. 
44 See AT&T v. Concepcion, No. 09-893(S. Ct. Apr. 27, 2011) (limiting the ability of courts to invalidate 
arbitration agreements based on traditional contract challenges, such as unconscionability).  But see H.R. REP. NO. 
68-96, at 1 (1924) (noting that Congress intended only to place arbitration “upon the same footing as other 
contracts”) (emphasis added).   
45 See discussion infra Subsection II.B.2-II.B.3. 
46 See discussion supra Section I.B. 
10 
 
arbitrators greater authority in overseeing disputes.47  As a result, the Supreme Court’s 
jurisprudence after Prima Paint created a “super” arbitration contract term in two ways:  (1) by 
broadly interpreting the individual sections of the FAA and (2) by applying the FAA to new 
contractual contexts.  With these decisions, the Supreme Court established a clear pro-arbitration 
bias that persists even into 2011 and gave contracting parties the “green-light” to employ the new 
“super” contract term in their agreements.     
1. Broadly Interpreting the FAA’s Sections and the FAA’s Applicability 
The Supreme Court’s first major expansion of the FAA’s reach occurred in the 1967 case 
of Prima Paint where the Supreme Court granted the arbitrator the authority to resolve legal 
issues as well as factual issues.48  In Prima Paint, the Court examined the issue of “whether a 
claim of fraud in the inducement of the entire contract is to be resolved by the federal court, or 
whether the matter is to be referred to the arbitrators.”49  Ultimately, the Court held that, despite 
potential conflicts with state rules on severability, the FAA required that the claim be submitted 
to the power of the arbitrator—rather than the courts.50   The dissent expressed concern over the 
majority’s decision to allow legal issues, such as fraud, “to be decided by persons designated to 
arbitrate factual controversies.”51  Further, the dissent argued that arbitrators, who are generally 
not lawyers, were “wholly unqualified to decide legal issues,” and that such an authority was 
never even anticipated by the framers of the FAA.52   
                                                 
47 Sternlight, supra note 12, at 1636. 
48 388 U.S. 395 (1967). 
49 Id. at 402.   
50 Id. 
51 Id. at 407 (Black, J., dissenting). 
52 Id. (Black, J., dissenting) (“I am fully satisfied that a reasonable and fair reading of that Act's language 
and history shows that both Congress and the framers of the Act were at great pains to emphasize that nonlawyers 
designated to adjust and arbitrate factual controversies arising out of valid contracts would not trespass upon the 




In 1984, the Supreme Court further expanded the FAA’s reach in Southland Corp. v. 
Keating by holding that the FAA applied to state courts as well as federal courts.53  This highly-
discussed decision proclaimed that the FAA preempted provisions in state laws that conflicted 
with the policies of the FAA and required state courts to apply FAA principles to determine 
whether those state laws were preempted.54  Notably, however, there is nothing in the legislative 
history to suggest that the framers of the FAA intended that the Act be applied to state courts.55  
Instead, there is specific language in the Act referencing only the statute’s application to federal 
courts; for example: (1) Section 1 specifically notes that the Act applies to contracts in interstate 
commerce, which suggests that the FAA should be applied in federal diversity cases, and (2) the 
statute makes numerous references throughout to the “United States district courts.”56  There is 
no mention of state courts or preemption in the statute.    
Not surprisingly, many states were unhappy with the imposition of federal law into an area 
over which they had always exercised exclusive authority.57  However, in the 1996 case of 
Doctor’s Associates v. Casarotto, the Court reaffirmed the FAA’s preemptive power, holding 
that state rules are preempted by federal law if they “undermine the goals and policies of the 
FAA” because conflicting state policies frustrated the intent of the FAA.58   
Along with decisions impacting the general use of the FAA, the Supreme Court has also 
issued several decisions examining the power and applicability of specific sections of the FAA.  
For example, Sections 9, 10 and 11 of the FAA set-forth the procedures for confirmation, 
                                                 
53 Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984).   
54 Id. at 16.   
55 But see generally Christopher R. Drahozal, In Defense of Southland: Reexamining the Legislative History 
of the Federal Arbitration Act, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 101 (2002) (arguing that the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Southland Corp. v. Keating was a proper application of the FAA).   
56 9 U.S.C. § 1-16 (2009).    
57 See supra notes 165-167 and accompanying text.   
58 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996).   
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vacatur, and modification of arbitration awards.59  Importantly, though nothing in the text of the 
statute suggests that parties are unable to modify these requirements, the Supreme Court in Hall 
Street Associates v. Mattel, Inc. held that parties cannot contract for expanded judicial review 
under these sections.60  In Hall Street, the Court examined a dispute between a lessor and lessee 
and held that FAA provided the “exclusive grounds for expedited vacatur and modification” of 
arbitration awards.61  The Court rejected the argument that “arbitration is a creature of contract” 
and so “the FAA is ‘motivated, first and foremost, by a congressional desire to enforce 
agreements into which parties ha[ve] entered.’”62  Instead, the Supreme Court interpreted 
Sections 9, 10, and 11 of the FAA to supersede even the contractually-based desires of the 
parties.   
Similarly, in Arthur Andersen LLP v. Carlisle, the Supreme Court expanded the 
protections afforded specifically by Section 3 of the FAA.63  Though the enforcement of 
arbitration agreements, like most contractual provisions, was originally left to those who were 
actual parties to the contract, the decision in Arthur Andersen allows “a litigant who was not a 
party to the relevant arbitration agreement [to] invoke § 3 if the relevant state contract law allows 
him to enforce the agreement.”64  Accordingly, as the applicable state law in Arthur Andersen 
allowed the petitioners, who were not party to the agreement, to enforce the contract against the 
signatory parties, the Court held that the relief provided by Section 3 for stays of litigation was 
                                                 
59 See 9 U.S.C. § 9 (2009 (confirmation); 9 U.S.C. § 10 (2009) (modification); 9 U.S.C. § 11 (2009) 
(vacatur). 
60 552 U.S. 576 (2008).   
61 Id. at 584.  However, the Supreme Court did not address the issue of whether “the agreement [should] be 
treated as an exercise of the District Court’s authority to manage its cases under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
16.”  Id. at 591.   
62 Id. at 585-86 (citing Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 220 (1985)).   
63 Arthur Andersen LLP v. Carlisle, 129 S. Ct. 1896 (2009).    
64 Id. at 1903.   
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also available to the petitioners.65  This decision appears to misguidedly apply Section 3—which 
specifically states that a stay can be granted “on application of one of the parties”—because it 
allows a stay to be granted even on the application of a non-party.66   
In 2010, the Supreme Court revisited an issue similar to that discussed in Prima Paint—
the authority of the arbitrator—when it decided Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson.67  In Rent-
A-Center West, the Supreme Court held that a provision delegating to an arbitrator the exclusive 
authority to resolve challenges made to the enforceability of the entire agreement was valid and 
enforceable.68  With this delegation in place, the court was limited in its ability to review 
disputes, having the authority to review only challenges made specifically to the enforceability of 
the arbitration agreement alone.69   Essentially, if a challenge is made to the validity of the whole 
agreement, the Hall Street decision allows courts to rubberstamp both the arbitration agreement 
and the delegation of authority to the arbitrator and then turn over responsibility for deciding the 
enforceability of the agreement to the arbitrator. This approach takes the court out of the 
decision-making process almost entirely, essentially allowing the court to wash its hands of the 
whole matter.  Accordingly, even though the arbitration agreement was a part of the entire 
contract, the Court treated it as an agreement independent of, and separate from, the contract as a 
whole, greatly expanding the power and authority of the arbitrator. 
With these interpretive decisions, the Supreme Court changed the role of the FAA.  The 
Court’s interpretations expanded the reach of the statute both as a general matter—such as 
applying the FAA as a whole to state courts—and in specific matters—such as limiting the 
                                                 
65 Id. 
66 9 U.S.C. §3 (2009). 
67 130 S. Ct. 2772 (2010). 
68 Id.  
69 Id.   
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parties ability to contract around Sections 9, 10, and 11 and applying the protections of Section 3 
to non-signatories.   
2. Applying the FAA to New Contractual Contexts 
Along with broadly interpreting the FAA, the Supreme Court after Prima Paint also 
issued decisions that expanded the FAA to new contractual contexts, many of which were 
traditionally hostile to arbitration—such as employment and commercial contracts.70  Notably, 
the application to the FAA to these additional contractual contexts appears contrary to the 
express language of the FAA, which states that the Act applies only to “maritime contract[s]” 
and in “contract[s] evidencing a transaction involving commerce.”71  Despite this language, the 
Supreme Court has upheld the use of arbitration agreements in almost all contractual contexts. 
For example, in the 1983 case of Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Const. 
Corp., the Supreme Court decided a dispute between a contractor and a hospital regarding the 
arbitrability of their contract claims and upheld for the first time an arbitration clause in a 
commercial contract.72  Two years later, in Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 
Inc., the Supreme Court examined the enforceability of arbitration in a statutory claim.73  In 
deciding Mitsubishi, the Court expressly stated that there was nothing in the FAA that prohibited 
arbitration of statutory claims, and nothing prevented the parties from excluding statutory claims 
                                                 
70 Sternlight, supra note 12, at 1636-38 ("With the approval and even encouragement of the Supreme Court, 
U.S. companies are increasingly using form contracts, envelope stuffers, and Web sites to require their consumers, 
patients, students, and employees to resolve future disputes through binding arbitration, rather than in court.”).  See 
also Schwartz, supra note 13, at 53-54 (noting that arbitration clauses have been regularly employed in numerous 
fields of commerce over the past several decades, including the securities industry, health care industry, insurance 
industry, banking and finance industries, and even employment). 
71 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2009).   
72 460 U.S. 1 (1983).  Importantly, despite there being no support for the Supreme Court’s expansion in 
either the text of the FAA or the legislative history of the statute, the Supreme Court commonly cites the FAA even 
when deviating from the text and intent of the statute.  For example, in Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury 
Const. Corp., the Supreme Court stated that “questions of arbitrability must be addressed with a healthy regard for 
the federal policy favoring arbitration” and that “[t]he Arbitration Act establishes that, as a matter of federal law, 
any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration.” 460 U.S. 1, 24-25 
(1983).  
73 473 U.S. 614 (1985) 
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from the scope of their arbitration agreement if they so wished.74  Instead, the Court noted that 
“[b]y agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not forgo the substantive rights afforded 
by the statute; it only submits to their resolution in an arbitral, rather than a judicial, forum.”75  
However, using that Court’s same reasoning, there was nothing in the statute that actually 
authorized the use of arbitration for statutory claims either. 
In 1989, the Supreme Court also upheld arbitration agreements in securities contracts.  In 
Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., the Court examined the enforceability 
of an arbitration agreement in a contract between a brokerage firm and securities investors and 
upheld the enforceability of a pre-dispute arbitration agreement under the Securities Act.76  In 
reaching this decision, the Court expressly overturned Wilko v. Swan, which had previously 
prohibited the use of arbitration agreements in this context.  The Court stated that “[t]o the extent 
that Wilko rested on suspicion of arbitration as a method of weakening the protections afforded 
in the substantive law to would-be complainants, it has fallen far out of step with our current 
strong endorsement of the federal statutes favoring this method of resolving disputes.”77 
After upholding the use of arbitration agreements in commercial contracts, statutory 
claims, and securities contracts, the Supreme Court examined the enforceability of arbitration 
agreements in employment contracts in 1991.78   In Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., an 
employee filed an age discrimination suit against his employer under the Equal Employment 
                                                 
74 Id. at 628. 
75 Id. 
76 490 U.S. 477, 481 (1989)  (“Once the outmoded presumption of disfavoring arbitration proceedings is set 
to one side, it becomes clear that the right to select the judicial forum and the wider choice of courts are not such 
essential features of the Securities Act that § 14 is properly construed to bar any waiver of these provisions.”). 
77 Id. at 481.   
78 Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991).  Though the FAA provides only for 
maritime contracts and contracts in evidencing transactions in interstate commerce, the Supreme Court expressly 
relied on the federal policy supporting arbitration to find that “[i]t is by now clear that statutory claims may be the 
subject of an arbitration agreement, enforceable pursuant to the FAA.”  Id. at 26. 
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Opportunity Commission (EEOC) after he was fired at the age of sixty two.79   In response, the 
employer filed to compel arbitration under the employment contract.80  After granting certiorari 
to review the enforceability of an arbitration agreement under the Age Discrimination 
Employment Act (ADEA), the Court held that the agreement was enforceable because “‘[h]aving 
made the bargain to arbitrate, the party should be held to it unless Congress itself has evinced an 
intention to preclude a waiver of judicial remedies for the statutory rights at issue.’”81  Unable to 
show a congressional intent precluding the use of arbitration for such claims, the Court upheld 
the use of the arbitration agreement, thus approving the use of arbitration in the employment 
context.82   
These cases provide only a few specific examples of the Court’s express approval of new 
contractual contexts.   Due to the continuous expansion into new contexts, the Supreme Court’s 
current arbitration jurisprudence supports the use of arbitration agreements in almost all areas.  
In fact, context today appears to be almost a non-issue in arbitration cases that come before the 
Court.   
3. The Result:  A “Super” Contract Term 
The Supreme Court’s decisions since Prima Paint in 1967—both its broad interpretation 
of the FAA and its approval of arbitration into new contractual contexts—have greatly changed 
arbitration jurisprudence in the United States, and   
[b]y the close of the 20th century[,] the United States Supreme Court in a series of 
ground breaking decisions had transformed the FAA from a mere procedural 
statute regulating the practice of arbitration in the federal courts into a substantive 
                                                 
79 Id.  
80 Id. at 23. 
81 Id. at 26 (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985)).  
82 Id. at 35.   
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law of arbitration having wide ranging impact on contracts involving interstate 
commerce containing arbitration agreements.83 
Transforming the FAA from a procedural statute to a substantive statute benefited large-
contracting parties hoping to limit their liability through arbitration provisions.  But Congress did 
not anticipate such a transformation when it passed the FAA.84  In discussing the new arbitration 
doctrine, one scholar noted that the Supreme Court’s application of congressional arbitration 
policy is overreaching and problematic:  
The Supreme Court has created a monster. With the Court's enthusiastic approval, 
pre-dispute arbitration clauses--agreements to submit future disputes to binding 
arbitration--have increasingly found their way into standard form contracts of 
adhesion. One would expect such agreements, which combine the “despotic” 
nature of arbitral decisionmaking with the “authoritarian” nature of adhesion 
contracts, to receive a good dose of what our profession likes to call “careful 
judicial scrutiny.” Our legal sensibilities tell us that where waiver of so important 
a right as access to the courts is imposed through a contractual form infamous for 
the absence of real consent, courts should draw a protective line by holding the 
form term at least presumptively unenforceable.85 
 
Still, “[o]nce the Supreme Court began to issue decisions stating that commercial arbitration was 
‘favored’ and that arbitration of employment claims could be permitted, businesses jumped on 
the opportunity to compel arbitration in contexts where they previously thought arbitration 
agreements would not be enforced.”86  With the Court treating arbitration as “super” contract 
terms, these repeat-contracting parties have benefited from the pro-arbitration bias in the law by 
using arbitration agreements more consistently and expansively than ever before.   
B. Disconnecting the Facts:  The Changing Assumptions on the Ground 
 The Supreme Court’s decisions since Prima Paint have disconnected arbitration law from 
national dispute resolution policy by treating arbitration as a “super” contract term and giving 
                                                 
83 John M. Townsend, “State Court Enforcement of Arbitration Agreements,” U.S. Chamber Institute for 
Legal Reform (Oct. 2006), available at www.instituteforlegalreform.org/get_ilr_doc.php?docId=487. 
84 See supra notes 31-44and accompanying discussion. 
85 Schwartz, supra note 13, at 36 (emphasis added).   
86 Sternlight, supra note 12, at 1638.   
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arbitration agreements more protection than other contract terms.  Importantly, however, the 
facts on the ground associated with arbitration over this same time period suggest that many of 
the assumptions that Congress relied upon in enacting the FAA are no longer accurate.  As such, 
these changing assumptions suggest that the Supreme Court’s arbitration jurisprudence lacks the 
necessary factual support to warrant the “super” contract term.  
When enacting the FAA in 1925, Congress likely relied on the original assumptions in 
place during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries—(1) that arbitration is fast, cheap 
and discrete; (2) that arbitrators can be neutral; and (3) that parties can bind themselves to 
contracts to which they assent—to create a statutory regime that provided for the use of 
arbitration to effectuate national dispute resolution policies.87  However, as Margaret Moss stated 
in her discussion of the current state of arbitration law,  
[t]he Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) that Congress adopted in 1925 bears little 
resemblance to the Act as the Supreme Court of the United States has construed 
it.  The original Act was intended to provide federal courts with procedural law 
that would permit the enforcement of arbitration agreements between merchants 
in diversity cases. The Supreme Court's construction of the statute, especially in 
the last twenty-five years, amounts to a judicially created legislative program, 
imposed without congressional input, that has vastly expanded the reach and 
focus of the original statute.88 
 
Accordingly, even though the Supreme Court’s arbitration jurisprudence on its own is sufficient 
to create a breakdown between arbitration law and arbitration policy, the disparity does not end 
there.  The assumptions on which the original statute relied are no longer the same facts on the 
ground—arbitration is no longer fast, cheap, and discrete; arbitrators are not always neutral; and 
parties are not always able to give real assent to contracts.  These new assumptions have caused a 
further breakdown in the arbitration trichotomy by removing the factual foundation that once 
supported pro-arbitration law. 
                                                 
87 See supra notes 23-33 and accompanying text.   
88 Margaret L. Moss, Arbitration Law: Who’s in Charge, 40 SETON HALL L. REV. 147, 147 (2010). 
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1. Fact One:  Arbitration is No Longer Fast, Cheap, and Discrete 
One of the primary benefits of arbitration has always been that it is a creature of contract, 
which means that it is significantly more flexible than other forms of dispute resolution.89  For 
example, unlike the legal system, arbitration procedures can be modified as desired by the 
contracting parties.  The parties can dictate the time, the place, the arbitrator, the allocation of 
costs, and numerous other procedural issues simply by bargaining with the other party and 
codifying their final agreement in the contract.  With this flexibility, arbitration is designed to 
promote efficiency because parties can bargain for the procedures and provisions that will 
benefit their individual needs.90   
However, rather than actually negotiating to create a custom-fit style of arbitration, most 
parties employ a “one-size-fits-all” style that is designed solely to benefit the more experienced, 
and more powerful, party.91  The more experienced party benefits by using efficient, standard-
form arbitration agreements and by limiting liability with terms favoring the repeat-player.92  
Using these “‘dedicated’ dispute resolution models” may be worthwhile to some businesses 
because “a repeatedly used contract template” may be the most cost-effective way to engage in 
“high-stakes commercial relationship[s].”93  However, the benefits for these arbitration 
agreements are generally not shared between both the parties.94  Due to the inexperienced 
contracting party’s inability to influence the terms of the agreement, the resulting arbitration 
                                                 
89 Stipanowich, supra note 99, at 388. 
90 Id. at 388-89. 
91 Id. at 400-06. 
92 Id. at 403. 
93 Id. 
94 See Stephan Landsman, Nothing for Something?  Denying Legal Assistance to Those Compelled to 
Participate in ADR Proceedings, 37 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 273, 279 (2010) (“The compulsory arbitration offered to 
customers, consumers, and employers has been aptly described as ‘quick and dirty.’  It is dominated by drafting 
party repeat players who impose it on an ill-informed and contractually powerless adhering population. It is used to 
control virtually all disputes between the ‘little guy’ and the large scale provider or employer. It frequently offers a 
sort of second-class justice.”). 
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agreements are often inefficient and one-sided—usually through provisions that make it too 
costly and time-consuming for the inexperienced party to pursue relief.95  Being able to modify 
contracts according to the needs of the parties helps promote efficiency by allowing the parties to 
bargain for the terms that provide them with the greatest advantages.96  With the increased use of 
standard-form agreements, however, arbitration often lacks the flexibility necessary to promote 
efficiency policies as well as it once did. 
Still, arbitration can be attractive to parties seeking low-cost and efficient dispute 
resolution mechanisms to limit their potential liability.  For example, business that deal with 
consumers can benefit from the lack of juries in arbitration because the absence of a jury is 
“commonly thought to reduce the likelihood of high damages awards against businesses.”97  
Similarly, limitations on discovery, the application of uniform procedures, restrictions on class 
actions, and other simplified procedures can lower costs for both parties and increase overall 
efficiency.98  However, “[d]espite meaningful efforts to promote better practices and ensure 
quality among arbitrators and advocates, criticism of American arbitration is at a crescendo.  
Much of this criticism stems from standard arbitration procedures that have taken on the 
trappings of litigation.”99  With expansions in discovery, extensive motion practice, “highly 
contentious advocacy, long cycle time, and high cost,” arbitration is unable to provide the same 
benefits—or the same fair and equitable results—that it once did.100  Accordingly, though 
arbitration has the potential to be a cost-saving, discrete, and efficient method of dispute 
                                                 
95 See, e.g., AT&T v. Concepcion, No. 09-893, slip op. at 9 (S. Ct. Apr. 27, 2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
96 Id.  
97 Stephen J. Ware, Paying the Price of Process:  Judicial Regulation of Consumer Arbitration Agreements, 
2001 J. DISP. RESOL. 89, 90 (2001). 
98 Id. at 90.   
99 Thomas J. Stipanowich, Arbitration and Choice:  Taking Charge of the “New Litigation,” 7 DEPAUL 




resolution, many of the benefits disappear when parties actually get involved in the process.101  
In their place, the parties often implement costly and inefficient procedures, such as allowances 
for class actions, caps on consumer fees, and requirements for substantial discovery.102  
As a result, arbitration is no longer a simplified replacement for civil litigation because it 
no longer provides procedures that ensure fast, cheap, and discrete resolution of claims.  Instead, 
with the rise in similarities between the new procedures in arbitration and the traditional 
procedures associated with litigation, “[a]rbitration is . . . being criticized . . . for becoming 
‘arbigation.’”103  Accordingly, though arbitration still has the potential to provide benefits in 
theory, it often fails to promote efficiency because of the parties’ own tendencies to include 
inefficient procedures in the agreements. 
2. Fact Two:  Arbitrators Are Not Always Neutral 
Along with changed costs and increased delays, arbitration may systematically favor 
repeat-players.  Specifically, a significant body of scholarship suggests that arbitral outcomes 
more often favor sophisticated bargaining parties who repeatedly employ arbitrators.104  As a 
result, arbitration firms often advertise to large, contracting parties for business and those 
companies often give repeat business to the arbitration firms that provide the best outcomes for 
them on a regular basis.105   
                                                 
101 Ware, supra note 97, at 94-98. 
102 Id. 
103 Donald R. Philbin, Jr. & Audrey Lynn Maness, Still Litigating Arbitration in the Fifth Circuit, but Less 
Often, 42 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 551, 552 (2010) (citing Thomas J. Stipanowich, Arbitration and Choice:  Taking 
Charge of the “New Litigation,” 7 DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L. J. 383, 384-85 (2009)) (playing on a combination of the 
words “arbitration” and “litigation” to illustrate the growing parallels between the two doctrines).   
104 See generally Lisa B. Bingham, On Repeat Players, Adhesive Contracts, and the Use of Statistics in 
Judicial Review of Employment Arbitration Awards, 29 MCGEORGE L. REV. 223 (1998) (finding that repeat-players 
in arbitration contracts tend to do better in arbitration than one-time players). 
105 See Nancy A. Welsh, What is “(Im)partial Enough” In a World of Embedded Neutrals?, 52 ARIZ. L. 
REV. 395, 419-421 (2010) (noting that large-scale contracting parties tend to use the same arbitration firms unless 
those arbitrators begin issuing decisions against them).   
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For example, there have been claims that the National Arbitration Forum (NAF)—a for-
profit arbitration firm that specializes in “resolving claims by banks, credit-card companies, and 
major retailers that contend consumers owe them money”—does not act as a neutral third-
party.106  NAF advertises “itself to lenders as an effective tool for collecting debts,” but it also 
provides promotional materials on its website indicating that is “a fair, efficient, and effective 
system for the resolution of commercial and civil disputes in America and worldwide.”107  After 
conducting a study of arbitration in the credit card industry, a non-profit organization called 
Public Citizen issued a report that suggested that “arbitration firms and credit card companies 
enjoy a cozy, mutually beneficial relationship at the expense of consumers they force into 
binding mandatory arbitration.”108  Relying on data from California, Public Citizen’s report 
detailed a 95% win rate for credit-card companies in mandatory arbitrations.109   
Some scholars have argued that such a disproportionate outcome is not as alarming as 
one might instinctually believe because “the consumer almost certainly owes the debt [in 
collection cases] and that this explains credit-card companies' high win rates in both arbitrations 
and traditionally litigated cases.”110  Still, other scholars have expressed concern over NAF’s 
tendency to “fire” arbitrators that rule in favor of debtors.111   
Richard Neely, former justice on the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, 
also served as an NAF arbitrator. Observing that NAF provided its arbitrators 
with a judgment form that was already completed and required consumers to pay 
arbitration fees that were substantially higher than court fees, Neely concluded 
                                                 
106 Robert Berner & Brian Grow, Banks vs. Consumers (Guess Who Wins), BusinessWeek, June 16, 2008, 
at 72 (discussing the for-profit arbitration company called the National Arbitration Forum and describing it as 
company that caters to, and provides advantages to, large-contracting companies). 
107 Id. (“What consumers don’t know is that NAF, which dominates credit-card arbitration, operates a 
system in which it is exceedingly difficult for individuals to prevail.”). 
108 See Public Citizen, The Arbitration Trap:  How Credit Card Companies Ensnare Consumers (Sept. 
2007), available at http://www.citizen.org/publications/publicationredirect.cfm?ID=7545. 
109 Welsh, supra note 105, at 419. 
110 Id. at 419 n.143 (citing Sarah Rudolph Cole & Theodore H. Frank, The Current State of Consumer 
Arbitration, 15 DISP. RESOL. MAG., Fall 2008, at 30, 31).   
111 See id. at 419. 
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that “[g]odless bloodsucking banks have converted apparently neutral arbitration 
forums into collection agencies to exact the last drop of blood from desperate 
debtors.”112 
With the proverbial axe hanging over their heads, arbitrators have a strong incentive to be biased 
in favor of repeat-contracting parties. 
Other industries experience unequal outcomes in arbitration as well.  In employment 
arbitration, for instance, there is evidence that “employees win less frequently than employers in 
arbitrations conducted pursuant to mandatory arbitration provisions inserted by employers in 
personnel manuals or handbooks.”113  And an “[e]mployees' likelihood of winning is even 
weaker when their employers are repeat players; their odds are worst of all when their employers 
have used the same arbitrator more than once.”114  Similarly, in securities arbitration, customers 
have also experienced disproportionate win-rates in comparison to large brokerage companies.115  
This is often the result of the brokerage firms’ selection of “pro-industry” arbitrators that can be 
relied on to rule in favor of the brokerage companies.116   
Though the disparate outcomes in these industries may cause some concern, these 
outcomes are likely due, at least in part, to the repeat-contracting party’s experience and use of 
standard-form agreements.  Many of these repeat-players are in the business of contracting with 
parties, and it is no surprise that they are able to draft valid, enforceable agreements that 
                                                 
112 Id. at 419 n.150 (citing Richard Neely, Arbitration and the Godless Bloodsuckers, W. VA. LAW., Sept.-
Oct. 2006, at 12). 
113 Id. at 421. 
114 Id. (“Employees' likelihood of winning is even weaker when their employers are repeat players; their 
odds are worst of all when their employers have used the same arbitrator more than once.”) 
115 Id. at 423. 
116 Id. (citing Jill I. Gross & Barbara Black, Perceptions of Fairness of Securities Arbitration: An Empirical 
Study 5 (University of Cincinnati College of Law , Pub. Law & Research Paper Series, No. 08-01, 2008).  See also 
Jennifer J. Johnson, Wall Street Meets the Wild West: Bringing Law and Order to Securities Arbitration, 84 N.C. L. 
REV. 123, 126 (2005) (“The National Association of Securities Dealers (“NASD”) handles the vast majority of 
securities arbitrations in the United States today.  While NASD insists that its arbitration forum is fair and functions 
smoothly, this claim is difficult to substantiate as NASD awards remain shrouded in relative mystery and 
anonymity.  NASD has captured the market for securities arbitration and because the courts have largely abandoned 
any pretense of overseeing the arbitration process, one is left to wonder what is really happening in the trenches.”). 
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naturally favor their interests.  Perhaps the biggest concern then is that the arbitrators in these 
industries are going into the arbitrations with preconceived ideas on who should win—even if 
that preconception is unnecessary because of a well-written arbitration agreement.  Arbitration is 
not designed to ensure equal win-rates between parties, but it does rely on the legitimacy 
provided by a neutral decision-making process.117  This new fact, however—that arbitrators are 
not always neutral—further disturbs the factual foundation upon which Congress based the FAA 
and upon which the Supreme Court bases its pro-arbitration bias.  If arbitration cannot provide 
parties with access to neutral arbitrators, then arbitration cannot provide parties with access to 
justice. 
3. Fact Three: Parties May Lack the Ability to Give Real Assent  
Along with decreased efficiency and concerns over the neutrality of arbitrators, the 
assumption that parties bind themselves to contracts to which they assent is also being called into 
question.  As arbitration is a deviation from the default guarantee that injured parties may 
petition for judicial relief of their grievances, arbitration must demonstrate that it provides a 
benefit that parties cannot get with judicial resolution—such as cost, speed, fairness, expertise, 
etc.118  Further, as arbitration requires that parties give up—at least to some degree—their right 
to seek judicial relief, the consent of the parties is necessary to give legitimacy to alternative 
dispute resolution.119      
Accordingly, if parties can dictate the terms of the own agreements, then enforcing those 
agreements would promote freedom of contract principles in national dispute resolution policies.  
                                                 
117 Id. at 422-24. 
118 Christopher R. Drahozal, Busting Arbitration Myths, 56 KAN. L. REV. 663, 664 (2008). 
119 Jeffrey W. Stempel, Bootstrapping and Slouching Toward Gomorrah:  Arbitral Infatuation and the 
Decline of Consent, 62 BROOK. L. REV. 1381, 1388 (1996) (“One can have both a judiciary meaningfully committed 
to consent jurisprudence and a set of regulations designed to achieve desired substantive policy for parties who 
consent to dispute via arbitration rather than litigation.  The two concepts are inconsistent only if the nation adopts a 
public policy that prefers arbitration far more than it prefers consent.”). 
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However, when repeat-contracting parties use methods designed to take away a less-
sophisticated party’s ability to truly assent—for example, through adhesion contracts with hidden 
agreements and with signs on the doors of establishments—arbitration’s ability to effectuate 
traditional notions of freedom of contract disappears.120  This is especially important today 
because arbitration has expanded into contractual contexts where assent is often believed to be a 
“fiction”—such as consumer and employment contracts.121  Ultimately though, without assent, 
arbitration loses one of its most important legitimating factors.122   
Adhesion Contracts and Hidden Agreements:  With greater use of arbitration agreements 
comes an increase in the number of challenges to those agreements.123  However, many parties 
still believe that the benefits of arbitration tend to outweigh the costs incurred by these 
challenges.124  As a result, many repeat-contracting parties still go to great lengths to ensure that 
arbitration agreements are incorporated in their contracts, often using standard-form adhesion 
contracts with boilerplate clauses.125  As “courts [now] enforce mandatory arbitration clauses in a 
                                                 
120 Id. at 1394 (“For the most part, contract is about consent. The concept of contract is best explained by 
notions of consent, and contract law is most legitimately supported by consent.”). 
121 See id. at 1386 (“In its rush to empower arbitration, the Court has overlooked traditional bedrock values 
of our legal system: consent, unconscionability, disclosure, fairness and federalism. . . . and [the Court’s] 
inconsistent approach has, among other things, reduced consent to a mere legal fiction, a shadow of its former 
self.”).  Arbitration prior to the enactment of the FAA was almost exclusively used between sophisticated 
commercial parties.  With that sophistication, the parties were able to truly assent to contract terms.  Arbitration 
today, however, is used in contractual contexts that often include unsophisticated parties, who—by their very 
nature—are less equipped to provide real assent.   
122 Id. at 1396 (“If arbitration is to continue as a contract driven mode of ADR, it must be adjudicated with 
ample respect for the importance of consent in contract law.”). 
123 See Patrick E. Higginbotham, The Present Plight of the United States District Courts, 60 DUKE L. J. 745 
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Empirical Evidence of Declining Award Finality, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 551 (2008).   
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125 Sternlight, supra note 12, at 1640-42. 
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wide variety of boilerplate contracts,” concerns over assent call into question whether arbitration 
is actually promoting freedom of contract principles.126   
In Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, the Supreme Court noted that “courts traditionally 
have reviewed with heightened scrutiny the terms of contracts of adhesion, form contracts 
offered on a take-or-leave basis by a party with stronger bargaining power to a party with weaker 
power.”127   The Court noted that some scholars have questioned whether adhesion contracts can 
ever be justified under traditional notions of contract law because there is a general consensus 
that signatories almost never read—and therefore cannot truly assent to—the terms of such 
contracts.128  Though the Court rejected the argument that adhesion contracts can never be 
justified, it did hold that adhesion contracts must be reviewed with heightened scrutiny because 
of the potential imbalance in bargaining power.129   
In practice repeat-contracting parties employ standard-form adhesion contracts as a 
general rule.  Given that one-shot contracting parties—such as consumers and most employees—
rarely read such contracts,130 the terms of the agreement do not always have the true assent of the 
adhering party.  Despite this, courts continue to enforce such contracts as if the parties had truly 
consented.131  While a blanket assent like this might work as a justification for binding parties to 
many types of contract terms, the FAA is premised on a classical model of rational assent to 
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arbitration.  Where that assent is lacking, the justification for arbitration as a contractual dispute 
resolution mechanism disappears.   
Signs on Doors:  Though “[c]ourts have always supported the use of voluntary binding 
arbitration,” the growth in businesses employing arbitration agreements without requiring 
express consent is on the rise.132  Many businesses hoping to benefit from arbitration are finding 
new and innovative ways to essentially trap consumers and patrons into binding themselves to 
arbitration agreements.133  For example, while home in Texas for the holidays, Christopher 
Anderson, a 1L student at Michigan State University College of Law, took a photograph of a 
sign taped to the door of a local burger franchise—a Whataburger restaurant.134  The language on 
the notice included: 
Arbitration Notice 
 
By entering these premises, you hereby agree to resolve any and all disputes or 
claims of any kind whatsoever, which arise from the products, services or 
premises, by way of binding arbitration, not litigation. No suit or action may be 
filed in any state or federal court. Any arbitration shall be governed by the 




Whether or not this particular notice is enforceable is unknown.  However, it is clear that 
businesses, spurred on by the pro-arbitration bias in law, are seeking to exploit contract 
                                                 
132 Sternlight, supra note 12, at 1636.  The courts’ support for binding arbitration, however, was limited to 
post-dispute agreements rather than pre-dispute agreements.  Id.   
133 “The Gates of Hell[ish Mandatory Arbitration]?” January 11, 2011, 
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/contractsprof_blog/2011/01/the-gates-of-hellish-mandatory-arbitration.html.  
Once the photo and description were posted on the ContractsProf Blog site, the listserv exploded with discussions 
about the changing levels of formality in contracts.   




formalities—which have been relaxed by the Court’s treatment of arbitration as a “super” 
contract term—when attempting to bind parties to arbitration agreements.136  
  Ultimately, national dispute resolution policies remain the same; these policies still 
include promoting efficiency, providing access to justice, ensuring freedom of contract, and 
diminishing the burden on the courts.  However, the facts that once allowed arbitration to support 
and effectuate those policies have changed.  Instead, arbitration has lost much of its 
effectiveness:  arbitration is not always cheap, quick, and discrete, so it does not really promote 
efficiency; arbitrators are not always neutral, so it does not always provide access to justice; and 
parties do not always rationally assent to the terms of the contracts, so it does not necessarily 
ensure freedom of contact.  As a result, the facts do not support the universal use of arbitration to 
effectuate properly dispute resolution policies, and they especially do not support the Supreme 
Court’s extreme pro-arbitration bias—the “super” contract term—in applying the FAA.   
III.  SOLVING THE ARBITRATION PROBLEM  
The Supreme Court’s approach to arbitration is unsustainable in light of the breakdown 
between arbitration facts, arbitration law, and arbitration policy.  First, the current “super” 
contract term in arbitration law is overreaching and fails to effectuate congressional policy.137  
Second, the original assumptions upon which Congress based the FAA are no longer true, which 
makes the expansion of the doctrine even more untenable because those facts suggest that 
arbitration is no longer a viable method of effectuating dispute resolution policies.138     
Both federal and state legislatures have introduced arbitration reform to combat the 
problems in the arbitration doctrine.  Similarly, courts at both the state and federal levels have 
                                                 
136 In a tongue-in-cheek response to absurd liability waivers such as this, Ian Ayres proposes a LiabiliT-
shirt, which would indicate express refusal to consent to waivers of liability on signs in or around establishments. 
“History of the LiabiliT,” http://www.whynot.net/merchandise/history.php. 
137 See discussion supra Section II.A. 
138 See discussion supra Section II.B.1-3.   
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also taken action to respond to the arbitration problem.  To date, however, these efforts have all 
proven largely unsuccessful, and additional arbitration reform on a national level is still 
necessary.   
A. Congress’s Response  
Congress has attempted to reform arbitration law by introducing proposals that “seek to 
exclude entire classes of claims (consumer, employee, franchise, and civil rights) from 
arbitration and to redraw the procedural line between decisions made by a court and decisions 
left to the arbitrator when the parties so provide.”139  Though many of these bills ended up dying 
in committee, they provide evidence that federal legislators are beginning to recognize and 
attempt to solve the new arbitration problem.140   
1. Congressional Acts—Proposed and Approved 
Congress recently amended arbitration law to regulate the use of arbitration in defense 
contracting and in the securities industry.  First, the 2009 Department of Defense Appropriations 
Act included restrictions on arbitration terms in contracts awarded to Department of Defense 
suppliers.  This bill—called the “Franken Amendment”—was a “response to Halliburton Co.'s 
efforts to require a former employee, Jamie Leigh Jones, to arbitrate rather than litigate claims 
related to her rape on company property by Halliburton employees.”141  Specifically, “[t]he 
amendment prohibits the award of Department of Defense funds to any federal contractor that 
forces its employees or independent contractors to submit to predispute binding arbitration of 
Title VII and sexual-assault tort claims.”142  The amendment essentially bars defense contractors 
                                                 
139 Id. 
140 See discussion infra Subsection III.A.1-III.A.2. 




from requiring employees to seek arbitration in cases where they have been sexually assaulted 
while on the job and for discrimination claims.143   
Similarly, the 2009 Dodd-Frank Act mandated reform to arbitration practices in the 
securities industry.144  In 1984, the Supreme Court set the stage for arbitration in the securities 
industry by enforcing pre-dispute arbitration agreements in brokerage contracts.145  Since this 
decision, “the vast majority of disputes between investors and broker-dealers are handled 
pursuant to mandatory pre-dispute arbitration agreements.”146  In fact, the National Association 
of Securities Dealers (NASD) requires that brokers submit to arbitration if their customers 
demand it, and “[e]mployees of member firms must also agree to arbitrate all disputes except 
those based upon claims of discrimination.”147   
Despite the prevalence of arbitration in the securities industry, the Dodd-Frank Act gives 
the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) authority to restrict mandatory pre-dispute 
arbitration in order to protect claims by whistleblowers.148  "This Act requires the SEC to 
conduct rulemaking prohibiting or limiting the use of mandatory arbitration pre-dispute 
agreements between customers and broker-dealers or investment advisers.”149  In effect, the Act 
seeks to protect whistleblowers working in the securities industry by giving the SEC the 
authority to “prohibit or limit mandatory predispute arbitration provisions” for claims brought 
under the Sarbanes Oxley Act.150   
                                                 
143 Department of Defense Appropriations Act, H.R. 3326, 111th Cong. (2009). 
144 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, H.R. 4173, 111th Cong. (2009).   
145 Jennifer J. Johnson, Wall Street Meets the Wild West: Bringing Law and Order to Securities Arbitration, 
84 N.C. L. REV. 123, 131 (2005). 
146 Id. 
147 Id. at 132. 
148 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, H.R. 4173, 111th Cong. (2009).  See 
also Giselle M. Barth, The Dodd-Frank Securitization Reforms, FDIC Safe Harbor Securitization Reforms and 
Rating Agency Reforms Panel:  Rating Agency Reforms Material, PLI Order No. 23048 (2010). 




2. Congressional Acts—Proposed But Not Approved 
Along with bills aimed at reforming limited areas of arbitration law, federal legislators 
also proposed two bills to completely overhaul specific sections arbitration law.151  The most 
influential and recognizable of these proposals is the Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009, which 
proposed a prohibition on the use of predispute arbitration agreements in employment, consumer, 
and franchise disputes and in disputes arising out of statutes that are intended to protect civil 
rights.152  Further, the bill also declared that the courts, not the arbitrators, had the authority to 
decide the validity and enforceability of the both the contract as a whole and the arbitration 
agreement on its own.153  Though the Arbitration Fairness Act stalled and died in committee, it 
provides evidence that federal legislators are beginning to recognize and respond to the 
disconnect between arbitration law and policy.154   
                                                 
151 Along with these very well known proposals, there have also been several other, more narrowly focused, 
bills that have been introduced in Congress.  For example, two acts recently introduced by Representative Linda 
Sanchez proposed limitations on the use of arbitration agreements for automobile purchase agreements and for 
nursing home admissions.  First, the Automobile Arbitration Fairness Act set-forth a new policy for arbitration 
agreements in automobile purchase contracts.  Automobile Arbitration Fairness Act, H.R. 5312, 110th Cong. (2008).  
Though the bill was voted out of the House Subcommittee on Commercial and Administrative Law on July 15th, 
2008, the act would have prohibited pre-dispute binding mandatory arbitration in automobile purchase contracts.  Id.  
Second, the Fairness in Nursing Home Arbitration Act of 2008, proposed a prohibition on mandatory, binding pre-
dispute arbitration in nursing home admissions contracts.  Fairness in Nursing Home Arbitration Act of 2008, H.R. 
6126, 110th Cong. (2008).  Though this bill was also voted out, it provides further evidence of legislative attempts to 
reconnect arbitration law with arbitration policy and the facts on the ground.   
152 Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009, H.R. 1020, 111th Cong. (2009-2010) .  See also Cong. Research Serv., 
Bill Summary & Status 111th Congress (2009 - 2010) H.R.1020 CRS Summary, THOMAS, (Feb. 12, 2009), 
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d111:H.R.1020:@@@D&summ2=m& (“Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009 - 
Declares that no predispute arbitration agreement shall be valid or enforceable if it requires arbitration of: (1) an 
employment, consumer, or franchise dispute, or (2) a dispute arising under any statute intended to protect civil 
rights.  Declares, further, that the validity or enforceability of an agreement to arbitrate shall be determined by a 
court, under federal law, rather than an arbitrator, irrespective of whether the party resisting arbitration challenges 
the arbitration agreement specifically or in conjunction with other terms of the contract containing such agreement.  
Exempts from this Act arbitration provisions in collective bargaining agreements.”). 
153 See supra note 152. 
154 David S. Steuer, A Litigator’s Perspective on the Drafting of Commercial Conflicts, PLI Order No. 
28797 (2011).  It is important to recognize that this bill was introduced to a Democrat-controlled Congress, but still 
failed to get the necessary support to become law.  If wide-scale reformation was going to occur at the federal level, 
it would likely have occurred with this bill. Accordingly, despite federal legislators’ recognition of the problem 
between arbitration law and policy, judicial action may be necessary to achieve the level of reform required to bring 
arbitration law back in line with arbitration policy.  See discussion infra Section III.D. 
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The Consumer Fairness Act of 2009 also sought to reform arbitration on a wide-scale 
level, but unlike the Arbitration Fairness Act, this bill focused exclusively on reforming the use 
of arbitration in consumer contracts.155  Specifically, this Act sought “[t]o treat arbitration 
clauses [that] are unilaterally imposed on consumers as an unfair and deceptive trade practice 
and prohibit their use in consumer transactions . . . .”156  With the extensive use of arbitration in 
consumer contracts, the impact of this bill would have been to greatly limit the use of arbitration 
agreements on a national level.  Notably, however, this bill also stalled and died in committee.  
Still, though neither of these bills became law, they do indicate recognition of the arbitration 
problem at the legislative level. 
B. States’ Responses  
 Along with efforts at the federal level, states have also introduced recent arbitration 
reform legislation.  Given federal preemption of most substantive arbitration law, state 
legislation is aimed less at changing arbitration law and more at impacting the realities of 
arbitration, such as arbitration inefficiency and arbitrator bias.  To do this, the legislation is 
primarily designed to limit the costs of arbitration and to ensure that arbitrators remain neutral.   
In New Jersey, for example, Governor Chris Christie signed state arbitration reform into 
law on December 21, 2010.157  This new legislation is aimed at reforming arbitration in 
collective bargaining for public employees.  This reform, which is “part of a wider set of 
proposals designed to get a grip on government costs and property taxes,” aims to create reform 
arbitration procedures for public employees by developing a “fast track arbitration process”158 
                                                 
155 Consumer Fairness Act of 2009, H.R. 991, 111th Cong. (2009-2010). 
156 Id. 
157 Tom Hester, “Christie signs New Jersey arbitration reform legislation,” NewJerseyNewsRoom.com.   
158 Id. To streamline the arbitration process, the bill requires that arbitrators issue a ruling within forty-five 
days or risk financial penalties. Id.  
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that caps arbitration awards,159 “[c]aps arbitrators’ pay,”160 “[i]ncreases ethical standards and 
training for interest arbitrators,” and “[r]andomizes the selection of arbitrators.”161   
Similarly, on March 10, 2011, Oklahoma also enacted arbitration reform aimed at 
collective bargaining for public employees.  The Oklahoma bill was designed “to create a system 
that is more fair and equitable for the taxpayers who bear the burden of its results.”162  The 
Oklahoma bill contains provisions (1) that “authoriz[e] the State Supreme Court to train 
Oklahoma arbitrators,” as opposed to bringing in out-of-state arbitrators to resolve contract 
disputes between municipalities and unions, and (2) that place restrictions on arbitrator’s 
awards.163  Though state legislation will likely have little impact on Supreme Court 
jurisprudence, these state reform bills indicate a nationwide awareness of the disparity between 
current arbitration law and current arbitration policy. 
C. Judicial Reforms  
Along with arbitration reform in the state and federal legislatures, lower courts have also 
recognized the inconsistencies between arbitration law and arbitration policy.164  In 1984, when 
the Supreme Court expanded FAA principles to state courts, “[t]he reaction of state courts 
varied, but many clung to their traditional hostility towards arbitration.”165  For example, in the 
1994 case of Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, “the attorneys general of twenty states filed 
                                                 
159 Increases in pay that can be awarded by the arbitrators are capped at 2%.  Id.   
160 Arbitrators’ pay is capped at $7,500, and they face penalties of $1,000 per day if they take more than 45 
days to issue a decision.  Id.   
161 Id.   
162 Press Release, Oklahoma State Senate, Senate Approves Binding Arbitration Reform Bill (March 10, 
2011), http://www.oksenate.gov/news/press_releases/press_releases_2011/pr20110310c.html. 
163 Id. 
164 Coyle, supra note 1 (“Although the justices have divided narrowly on some issues, their decisions have 
generally been pro-arbitration, according to litigators and scholars. That trend is in contrast to the increasing 
skepticism shown by lower courts and lawmakers about arbitration's claim to greater efficiency and less cost than 
court litigation.”).  See also Ramona L. Lampley, Is Arbitration Under Attack?: Exploring the Recent Judicial 
Skepticism of the Class Arbitration Waiver and Innovative Solutions to the Unsettled Legal Landscape, 18 CORNELL 
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 477, 480 (2009) (arguing that “judicial support for arbitration in some contexts is waning").   
165 Townsend, supra note 83. 
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amicus briefs asking the Supreme Court to overturn its 1984 decision [applying the FAA to the 
states] and to permit the states to enforce state anti-arbitration statutes.”166  Clearly, the state 
courts were concerned about the new direction and expansion of arbitration law.  In response to 
the state outcry, however, the Supreme Court reiterated its 1984 decision and held that state 
policies and rules that contradicted the purpose and intent of the FAA were preempted by the Act 
and thus unenforceable and invalid.167   
Still, some state jurisdictions continue to restrict the use of arbitration, especially in 
consumer and employment contracts.168  As a report from the U.S. Chamber Institute for Legal 
Reform stated, “[s]tate courts frequently exhibit hostility to arbitration agreements in the 
consumer context that assign unilateral control over the process to the corporate party, or which 
allow only that party access to the courts.”169  For example, “[r]ecent decisions in California state 
courts and the Ninth Circuit . . . show that the same judicial hostility ostensibly thwarted eighty 
years ago continues today, albeit in a more subtle—but equally hostile—form.”170   
Similarly, research conducted by the U.S. Chamber Institute for Legal Reform to 
determine “whether the mandate of the FAA and the Supreme Court decisions implementing it 
have now been fully accepted by the state courts” found that there were indications of lingering 
resistance toward arbitration in both Alabama and California.171  Alabama, for example, 
continues to resist the use of arbitration agreements in consumer contracts where one party has 
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167 Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265 (1995). 
168 See Townsend, supra note 83.  See also Michael G. McGuinness & Adam J. Karr, California's 
“Unique” Approach to Arbitration:  Why This Road Less Traveled Will Make All the Difference on the Issue of 
Preemption Under the Federal Arbitration Act, 2005 J. DISP. RESOL. 61 (2005) (discussing California’s treatment of 
arbitration).   
169 Townsend, supra note 83 (“Decisions from courts in California, Alabama, Wisconsin, and Tennessee 
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less bargaining power than the other, in contracts where one party controls the dispute-resolution 
process, and in contracts with class action waivers.172  Similarly, “courts in California translate 
their judicial hostility into seemingly innocuous pronouncements of ‘unconscionability’ and 
‘unwaivable statutory protections.’”173  That resentment toward arbitration is applied through 
California’s “new brand of unconscionability . . . [which] is far more demanding” and “unique to 
arbitration.”174 
D. The Supreme Court’s Response 
Despite national recognition of the problems caused by the disparity between arbitration 
law and arbitration policy, the Supreme Court continues to maintain a pro-arbitration bias.175  
Over the past half century, “[t]he Supreme Court has undertaken the development of the law of 
arbitration with disregard for the text and the legislative history of the FAA, such that it amounts 
to pure judicial legislation.”176  Even today, the Supreme Court continues to ignore the problems 
in the arbitration doctrine.  For example, on April 27, 2011, the Supreme Court issued a decision 
in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion that upheld a class action waiver and enforced an 
agreement requiring the parties to arbitrate their disputes.177  This decision expressly overturned 
the District Court’s and the Ninth Circuit’s holdings that the agreement requiring arbitration—
but prohibiting class arbitration—was unconscionable.178   
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173 McGuinness & Karr, supra note 168, at 61.   
174 Id. at  62.   “[I]n the context of arbitration, there has been very little that California courts have not 
found unconscionable.”  Id. at 85.   
175 See discussion supra Section II.A.  
176 Moss, supra note 88, at 188-89. 
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Prior to Concepcion, the right of lower courts to refuse to enforce arbitration agreements 
based on local contract law—such as unconscionability—was protected.179  Section 2 of the FAA 
even specifically provides that arbitration agreements that meet the requirements under the 
statute “shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in 
equity for the revocation of any contract.”180  By including the language at the end of Section 
2—“save upon such grounds as exist at law”—the statute evidences an intent that arbitration 
agreements be placed only on equal footing as other contract provisions, which means that they 
can also be invalidated on the same grounds as other contractual terms.  However, the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Concepcion essentially strips lower courts of their ability to issue any 
decision that frustrates the enforceability of an arbitration agreement, regardless of the grounds 
upon which the agreement is being challenged.  This decision firmly establishes the arbitration 
“super” contract term that has been developing in Supreme Court jurisprudence since Prima 
Paint.  
Along with taking even more authority from the lower courts to limit the reach of pro-
arbitration law, the decision in Concepcion also evidences the Supreme Court’s failure to 
consider the changing facts on the ground associated with arbitration.  For example, in deciding 
Concepcion, the Supreme Court stated that class arbitration would frustrate key benefits of 
arbitration, including its flexibility and its informality.181  However, as discussed earlier in this 
paper, evidence suggests that arbitration today includes many of the same characteristics as 
litigation, making it neither as flexible nor as informal as the Supreme Court presumes it to be.182  
                                                 
179 Id. slip op. at 8 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting that “even though contract defenses, e.g., duress and 
unconscionability, slow down the dispute resolution process, federal arbitration law normally leaves such matters to 
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toward arbitration agreements.  See discussion supra Section III.C.   
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As a result, the Court’s concerns over allowing class arbitration seem largely unfounded as a 
class approach would actually recognize the changing facts on the ground—that arbitration is 
behaving in much the same way as traditional litigation.  At the very least, the Supreme Court’s 
unequivocal suggestion that arbitration is still flexible and informal fails to fully appreciate the 
changing facts on the ground.     
Decisions like Concepcion motivate large-contracting parties to continue practices that 
are designed to take advantage of one-time players.183  For example, in Concepcion, the plaintiffs 
wanted to consolidate their claim in a class action because they only sought $30.22 in damage.184  
As Justice Breyer questions in the dissent, “[w]hat rational lawyer would have signed on to 
represent the Concepcions in litigation for the possibility of fees stemming from a $30.22 
claim?”185  As a result, the arbitration agreement in this case operates as an almost impenetrable 
shield for the large-contracting party by eliminating—almost completely—the other party’s 
ability to seek relief.  Accordingly, large-contracting parties have a strong incentive to include 
these types of arbitration agreements in their contracts, and they will continue to engage suspect 
contracting methods—including the use of hidden agreements in standard-form adhesion 
contracts and the absurd placement of arbitration agreements—to achieve that end.   
Ultimately, the Supreme Court has two options to respond to the current arbitration 
problem.  First, the Supreme Court can continue to apply arbitration law as it currently does and 
simply wait for legislation that will potentially invalidate years of legal decisions concerning 
arbitration by expressly countering decades of pro-arbitration jurisprudence.  Or, second, the 
Supreme Court can begin responding to arbitration issues with an aim toward arbitration reform 
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by acknowledging that the policy and facts upon which it once relied are no longer as 
unwavering as once believed.    
As Congress’s attempts at arbitration reform have been largely ineffectual at bringing 
arbitration law back in line with arbitration policy,186 the first option will likely provide little 
relief toward correcting the disparity in the arbitration doctrine.  Further, as Supreme Court 
jurisprudence caused much of the current arbitration problem,187 the Court will likely be in the 
best position to redress the breakdown in the arbitration trichotomy.   Accordingly, the Supreme 
Court should follow the second approach and act to address the disparity between arbitration 
law, arbitration policy, and arbitration facts.  To do so, the Supreme Court should issue decisions 
that reflect the express language of the FAA and that do not conflict with the intent evidenced in 
the legislative history. 
One option for the Court to achieve this end would be to return to traditional models of 
contractual consent and enforce only those arbitration agreements to which the parties have 
expressly consented.188  Though this will not overcome concerns regarding increased costs in 
arbitration and arbitrator neutrality, it will at least require that repeat-contracting parties get true 
assent from parties.189  Requiring such assent will help restore some of the legitimacy of the 
arbitration doctrine because it will force parties that do not traditionally read contracts to take 
special actions to demonstrate their consent to the arbitration agreement—such as by initialing or 
signing the agreement itself.190  Such a requirement will help alert even unsophisticated parties to 
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187 See discussion supra Section II.A.1-3.   
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the significance of the provision and perhaps, once the parties are made aware of the provision, 
such a requirement may even encourage the parties to actively bargain for the terms. 
Even if the Supreme Court chooses an approach different from the consent requirement 
discussed above, the fact remains that the current state of arbitration law is largely untenable.  
The United States’ relies considerably on alternative dispute resolution, and arbitration is used 
expansively throughout key industries—such as employment and commercial contracts.  
Accordingly, correcting the disparity in arbitration law and arbitration policy is simply too 
important an endeavor for the Supreme Court to simply “wait and see.”   
CONCLUSION 
The ultimate goal for the arbitration doctrine is to ensure that the facts, the law, and the 
policy coincide and complement one another.  In the United States, the initial hostile treatment 
toward arbitration agreements caused a breakdown in this trichotomy.  However, when Congress 
enacted the Federal Arbitration Act in 1925, these three elements were, theoretically, in harmony 
for nearly fifty years.  However, when the Supreme Court began expanding arbitration law 
beginning with Prima Paint, it created a disparity between the law and the policy.  As a result, 
arbitration law currently treats arbitration provisions as “super” contract terms, and this treatment 
encourages repeat-contracting parties to exploit the relaxed contract formalities that have 
resulted.   
 Despite the congressional and judicial efforts to bring arbitration law back in line with 
arbitration policy, the Supreme Court continues to issue decisions that expand arbitration law.  
The Court should instead focus on issuing decisions that reach a compromise between supporting 
the pro-arbitration policy in the FAA and recognizing the changing value of arbitration as a 
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dispute resolution mechanism.  Such a compromise will realign arbitration law to properly reflect 
the facts on the ground and allow arbitration to truly effectuate dispute resolution policies.   
Ultimately, “[a]rbitration remains under national klieg lights. It has ‘become a wide-
ranging surrogate for civil litigation’ in a wider variety of contracts than at any time in our 
nation's history.”191  At the very least, the Court should avoid issuing decisions that will only 
make the problem worse.  By making an active decision to begin considering arbitration policy 
now—rather than waiting until Congress issues legislation aimed at expressly curbing the Court’ 
arbitration jurisprudence—the Supreme Court can take an active stance in forging the new path 
for arbitration law.   
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